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A significant number of security breaches result from employees’ failure to comply 
with security policies.  The cause may be an honest mistake – e.g. when an employee 
enters their password in a phishing website, believing it to be a legitimate one 
(Dhamija et al., 2007), or because they are faced with an impossible task – e.g. when 
an employee has so many different passwords that she has to write them down 
(Adams & Sasse, 1999).   
 
But there is also evidence that in some cases, employees may chose not to make the 
effort required to comply with manageable security tasks (Weirich, 2005).  When 
asked for reasons for not complying, most respondents justify this with the impact of 
security measures on personal and company productivity, the perceived absence of 
risks, and that most of their fellow employees do not comply, either (Weirich, 2005, 
Beautement et al., 2008).   
 
Many organizations would like to change employees’ behaviour to achieve higher 
levels of compliance with their information security policies.  Johnson & Goetz 
(2007) report a security manager of a major international company saying:  
 
“My biggest challenge is changing behavior. If I could change the behavior of our 
[…] workforce, then I think I’ve solved the problem.” 
 
The problem is that changing established behaviour in organisations is a notoriously 
difficult task.  Security policies often threaten employees with sanctions if policies are 
not followed.  Johnson & Goetz (2007) report that some organisations have tried to 
change employee behaviour by placing more responsibility for security compliance on 
line managers by applying financial penalties if one of their subordinates causes a 
security breach. This approach may have the benefit of adding a personal dimension 
to an individual employee’s decision-making.  But like all forms of negative 
reinforcement, sanctions are only be effective in shaping behaviour when applied 
consistently whenever the policy is not followed.  However, unless non-compliance 
results in a security breach, it is hard to detect (Vroom and von Solms, 2004), and 
more often than not goes unpunished.  
 
To detect and punish non-compliance consistently – taking an approach that could be 
characterised as ‘comply-or-die‘ - an organisation would have to expend significant 
resources on monitoring and enforcement of policies.  This is, arguably, not a suitable 
way to run security in commercial organisations: 
 
“Security […] is a means to an end and not an end in itself. For example, in a 
private- sector business, having good security is usually secondary to the need to 
make a profit. Security, then, ought to increase the firm's ability to make a profit.” 
 
An Introduction to Computer Security (NIST Special publication 800-12) 
 This raises the question of whether it is possible to increase compliance without 
taking the expensive ‘comply-or-die’ approach.  A study which elicited and analysed 
employees’ reasons for not complying with security policies found that decisions 
were largely based on individual’s assessment of the cost and benefit involved in 
complying with a security policy (Beautement et al. 2008) .  The cost-benefit 
decisions they described were idiosyncratic (centred on the nature of their work), but 
not entirely selfish: when participants were aware of the specific risk that the policy 
was mitigating, they were more likely to comply.  When they decided not to comply, 
participants justified this in terms of the negative impact of security policies on 
organisational productivity (e.g. a lost sale because they could not access the system 
and produce a quote in time) as often as to the impact they had on them (e.g. the 
difficulty to recall passwords).  Employees weighed the perceived need for a specific 
security policy against the perceived effort required to comply with it.  Since these 
decisions influence compliance behaviour, we decided to explore  whether and how 
these decisions can be influenced by security managers.  It turns out that established 




According to microeconomic utility theory, a person
1 makes purchasing decisions 
based on available resources and preferences for the goods on offer with the aim of 
maximising their utility; utility being a measure of that person’s satisfaction with the 
ownership or consumption of those goods. As the price and availability of goods 
changes, so does the person’s purchasing strategy:  
Person X might normally prefer item A to item B. But - if she finds she can purchase 
10 item Bs for the same price as 5 item A - she may decide to buy item B, because she 
perceives the value of 10 B’s to be higher than that of 5 A’s. The point at which the 
person perceives the ratio of A and B to be equivalent is the point at which she is 
indifferent which of the two options she gets (say, given a choice is between 5 item 
A's and 7 item B's, she has no preference). Using these perceived values, it is possible 
to plot an indifference curve which shows the points at which people will trade-off 
between A and B with no loss of utility (see Figure 1).  
 
                                                
1 According to economic theory, the decision-marking organisations as well as individuals – we are 
using an individual person here to illustrate the point.  
Figure 1: An example indifference curve showing the rate at which two goods, A and 
B, can be traded off without preference. 
 
It is, however, important to recognise most people do not make a rational choice: this 
would require that a complete - or near complete - overview of the decision context 
(i.e. all available options, and the full short- and long-term consequences of choosing 
that option). Thaler & Sunstein, (2008) provide an excellent summary of decision 
making by real people (humans), vs. the rational choices made by the rational actors 
assumed in economic theories (econs). In our interview data, we saw that a similar 
process applies when employees decide whether to comply with a security policy: our 
participants considered a limited set of subjective factors when deciding whether to 
comply, and described the choice between complying and not complying as being 
driven by the anticipated consequences of each option. Following security policies 
usually requires employees to expend some effort; and usually, the perception of that 
effort exceeds the perceived benefits they derive from the effort.  Conversely, not 
following security policies usually means less effort for the individual, but may create 
risks for the organisation (vulnerabilities) and the individual (being caught and 
punished). The indifference curve represents the point at which the perceived 
cost/benefit ratio of following security policies and not following them are equally 
balanced; when the perceived cost-benefit outcome of following the policy clearly 
exceeds the cost-benefit outcome of not doing so, employees have to make a 
compliance effort. Every time compliance effort is required, the amount is noted 
implicitly by the individual, and it will accumulate over time.  The key insight from 
our study was that the amount of compliance effort employees are willing to expend is 
finite - this is what we call the compliance budget. As this begins to run out an 
employee may see more utility in completing tasks more directly relevant to them 
rather and begin to trade these off with security tasks. 
 
The employee’s perception of different costs and benefits, and the environment in 
which they are making their compliance decisions will change over time. Short-term 
changes - including emergencies and deadlines - affect the compliance threshold of an individual employee. An employee under pressure from a deadline may be more 
willing to take risks. Being asked to make an effort during unpressured stretches of a 
working day may not be seen as a problem, but being asked to complete the same task 
at the end of a long working day will make it seem far more onerous. 
 
The exact amount of effort employees spend varies between both employees and 
organisations – some employees are inherently more inclined to follow policies, and 
in some sectors employees accept the need to manage risks more than in others – but 
we propose that for all individuals, there is a limit to the extra effort they will expend 
over a given time period on a secondary task such as security. The closer an employee 
is to their compliance threshold, the more burdensome additional tasks will appear 
subjectively. Organisations can exceed the budget occasionally without triggering a 
dramatic response. However, employees who are “over the limit” will be less likely to 
comply when further effort is required... It is therefore important to manage tasks in 
such a way that the perceived effort does not routinely exceed this limit.  In the long 
term, keeping employees “over the limit” will lead to a negatively charged 
relationship between the individual and the organisation, and this will make 
employees with marketable skills more likely to leave, and breed resentment in those 
who stay behind.  Both consequences affect the organisation’s bottom line; the latter 
also creates new security risk because disgruntlement is the prime motivating factor in 






Figure 2: How perceived individual costs relate to effectiveness of security. 
Alternative rates of compliance expenditure are also shown for comparison. Once the 
compliance threshold is crossed security effectiveness drops sharply as the employee elects to complete tasks that benefit him more directly as an individual rather than 
security tasks that more benefit the organisation as a whole. 
 
While the precise shape of the graph in figure 2 cannot be plotted with total accuracy, 
and will show variations from individual to individual the same core features will 
occur. As the figure 2 illustrates, a well-managed budget will spend perceived effort 
at a slower rate. This means that more security policies can be accommodated before 
the compliance threshold is reached, resulting in a higher effective security level. 
Once the limit is exceeded,  security policies are less likely to be followed, and 
effective security will start to decline. In the worst case, the organisation will lost its 
most valuable employees, and breed disgruntled staff, thus creating additional security 
risks.  
 
Based on our observations, we propose that the best way of achieving compliance is 
to accept that extra effort employees will make to comply with security policies is a 
limited resource, and that - like any another limited resource - it needs to be budgeted 
and managed correctly. The principles of the compliance budget can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
1.  There is a limit to the amount of perceived effort an employee will expend 
on security tasks.  
2.  This means that any individual security policy associated with 
significantly more perceived cost benefits is likely to be followed.    
3.  When employees expend compliance effort, it accumulates over time, and 
once an employee’s compliance limit is reached, she is less likely to 
follow any security police with compliance effort. 
4.  The rate at which the budget is spent matters: the more rapidly they 
approach their limit, the less likely they are to comply. 
 
 
3. Managing the Compliance Budget 
 
Understanding the implications of the compliance budget will benefit an organisation 
because it will a) reduce friction between individuals and the organisation, and b) 
increase security compliance.  And we suggest that it will c) lead to a better 
integration of security into the organisation’s primary business processes, realising the 
ambition that security should to increase the ability of the organisation to make a 
profit. NIST reference [ref no.] In this section, we provide some examples of how an 
organisation can work towards this ideal using the compliance budget principles. 
 
Step 1: Auditing security effort 
 
Getting to grips with the compliance budget requires establishing the actual and 
perceived workload associated with security policies that employees have to follow.  
In most organisations today, the workload associated with security policies is “pushed 
down” towards individual employees, with little though of whether the effort is 
manageable, or how disruptive it is to the employee’s primary tasks (Sasse et al., 
2001).  Security managers should know how many security policies any group of 
employees has to deal with, and how much effort each group has to expend on 
complying with them. They also need to collaborate with business owners and line managers to determine the impact on individual and organisational productivity, and 
where the threshold of acceptability lies.  
 
Step 2: Considering the overall cost and benefit of security policies 
 
In a recent case study, we compared the password policies of two large financial 
organisations. Policy 1 required shorter but more complex passwords, while Policy 2 
required longer, but less complex passwords. Our analysis of these passwords using 
the compliance budget theory showed that the users of Policy 1 passwords required 
longer times to on average to enter their passwords.  They also had a longer learning 
period – i.e. it took them longer to reach error-free performance. And when we 
compared the reset rates for these two passwords (requested resets per use for 
forgotten passwords) we found that the policy 1 passwords were being renewed more 
than twice as often as the policy 2 passwords.  
 
This increased volume of resets indicates that the password is not being used 
frequently enough to cope with the cognitive burden and longer learning period that 
the password policy dictates. Our research also indicates that password length places 
less of a burden on users than password complexity (represented by the range of non-
lower case letters in the password). In this case, trading complexity for length to 
maintain security but reducing the burden on its users (which is in line with Step 1). 
In line with Step 2, choosing Policy 2 reduces the operational cost for the organisation 
and increases productivity. By using compliance budget security managers can 
identify security policies that provide the required level of risk mitigation at the 
lowest cost to individuals and the organisation. 
   
Step 3: Influencing the Compliance Threshold 
 
Security managers can raise the compliance threshold by communicating the risks the 
organisation faces, and making clear links between those risks, and the behaviour that 
security policies require. This will increase the perceived benefits of policies that 
require a significant compliance effort, but are genuinely necessary to manage 
organisational risks.   
 
 
Step 4: Why less friction means better overall risk mitigation 
 
An employee pushed over their compliance threshold increases the risk to an 
organisation in two ways. As discussed in section 2, once an individual is working at 
or over their compliance limit they will begin to adopt insecure behaviours. Typically, 
these will result in neglecting or bypassing onerous security procedures, creating 
potential vulnerabilities in the security system which might be exploited by external 
attackers. For instance, in an organisation where most employees have problems 
recalling their password, a social engineering attacker claiming to be a fellow 
employee who has locked himself out of the systems has a high chance of success. 
In the long term, we would argue that it is likely to increases the risk of insider attacks 
to two ways.  Recent research on insider attacks (Richardson, 2003) has shown that 
the approximately 80% of organisations see their own workers as a likely source of 
attack, and an increase in vulnerabilities means more opportunities for exploitation by internal attackers.  For instance, if employees write their passwords onto post-its and 
whiteboards, they make it easier for a fellow employee to misuse their access. 
 
An employee forced to work over their compliance budget will also build up 
resentment towards the parent organisation, which is likely to result in 
disgruntlement. Capelli at al. (2009) have shown that disgruntlement is the starting 
point for many employees who end up attacking their own organisation’s system.   
 
Based on their findings, the CERT researchers say that correct management has to 
“pay close attention to many aspects of its organization, including its business 
policies and procedures, organizational culture, and technical environment. It must 
look beyond information technology to the organization’s overall business processes 





We argue that applying the principles of the compliance budget to manage human 
effort in security adds a dimension to security management. Tracking user effort is 
important and effective in both maintaining security and reducing friction between 
employees and organisations, and between business and security processes in an 
organisation.   
 
There is an important principle at the core of our discussion between security 
effectiveness and user effort. It is often suggested that there is a trade-off between 
usability and security – that reducing employees’ security effort means reducing the 
level of security, and conversely, that it is legitimate to increase employee’s effort 
because security is important. We argue that the trade-off in this form is overly 
simplistic and misleading.  As we have argued in section 3, placing too much burden 
on employees will creates new risks for an organisation’s security. The trade-off 
exists only for a limited range, and there is an optimal operating point - somewhere 
close to, but below the compliance threshold. This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 Figure 3: How user effort and effective security trade off against each other. This is 
not a pure trade-off: the striped region as illustrates the area where attempting to 
increase user effort results in insecure behaviours rather than higher security. 
 
It is possible to move a security system closer to this operating point, through 
effective decision-making and manipulation of the context in which security policies 
are used. This point is not just optimal in terms of delivering security, but also optimal 
in an economic sense, because for it represents the best return financial resources and 
human effort expended on security. Beyond this point, either  
 
1.  the security policies are not followed, opening up vulnerabilities, or 
2.  significant resources are needed to 
a.  monitor the employee behaviour and enforce sanctions, and 
b.  deal with the problems of employees who cannot cope. 
 
If the system is operating below this point, there is room for improvement, and 
security measures are not operating at their full capacity. This approach goes hand in 
hand with the notion that security should support the primary business process not 
unnecessarily interfere with it. Managing the compliance budget effectively then 
becomes a primarily financial decision driven by the needs of the organisation as a 
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